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Abstract 
The prevalence of poverty in a given population is determined by both the level of average 
income and the shape of income distribution. Accordingly, the difference in poverty between two 
populations can be attributed to disparities in their average incomes and in the levels of income 
inequality. In this paper, we decompose the differences in relative poverty between each of the 
twenty-one Croatian counties and Croatia as a whole into the contributions of the mean income 
and income inequality, using the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. The decomposition 
framework that we utilize here is one usually applied for decompositions of intertemporal poverty 
changes, and is based on the concept of Shapley value from cooperative game theory. Poverty is 
measured by three conventional measures – the headcount ratio, the poverty gap, and the squared 
poverty gap – and robustness of the results to switching from one measure to another is 
discussed. The results of decompositions show that in most cases both the mean income and 
inequality differences contribute to poverty variation across the counties, relative to poverty in 
Croatia as a whole. When poverty is measured by the headcount ratio, the income contribution 
dominates the inequality contribution, while when we switch to the other two measures, which 
give more weight to poorer among the poor, the inequality contribution starts to dominate.     
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1  Introduction 
That the material standard of living in a given population is determined, in principle, by both the 
average income and income distribution is a well established fact. Although there is a strong 
negative correlation – both across space (countries, regions within countries) and over time – 
between the level of average income and the prevalence of low living standards, the fact that even 
in the developed world there still are people living in poverty suggests that how income is 
distributed is important as well. Thus, to maximize effectiveness of a poverty alleviation program 
– or, generally, any other policy measure aimed at improving the living standards – one should be 
concerned with both its efficiency and equity aspects. The efficiency aspect concerns increasing 
the average income, while the equity aspect is focused on distributive issues, that is, how the 
aggregate income is distributed over the individuals comprising the population. However, the two 
aspects are not always equally important for policy effectiveness, and knowing which of them 
should be given more attention at a given moment requires knowledge of how much poverty is 
due to low income and how much due to income inequality. In other words, for a given difference 
in poverty between two populations, one has to be able to measure the respective contributions of 
differences in the average income and inequality. In principle, the fact that one population enjoys 
higher average income than another does not guarantee that poverty is lower in the former 
population: the higher average income may be accompanied by more unequal income 
distribution, and the net outcome may be higher, rather than lower, poverty level.  
 In the existing literature, the exercise of decomposing the difference in poverty between 
two populations into the average income and inequality contributions1 is usually performed in 
intertemporal settings; that is, for a given country (or some other spatial unit) over time (see, e.g., 
                                                 
1 Precise definitions of these two contributions will be given in section 3. 
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Kakwani and Subbarao 1990; Jain and Tendulkar 1990; Datt and Ravallion 1992; Kakwani 2000; 
Baye 2006; Verme 2006; Zhang and Wan 2006; Bresson and Labar 2007). Similar decomposition 
exercise can, however, as well be done in spatial settings, by decomposing cross-country or 
cross-regional (within a country) poverty differences. Indeed, there are no conceptual differences 
between applications in intertemporal and spatial settings; the only difference is in interpretation. 
Yet, in spite of this fact, there are surprisingly few spatial applications in the existing literature. 
To the best of our knowledge, the only two papers on the topic are Kolenikov and Shorrocks' 
(2005) and Dhondge's (2005) studies of regional poverty in Russia and India, respectively. In this 
paper, we aim at contributing to the empirical literature on this neglected topic by studying 
regional poverty differences in Croatia. We use the Household Budget Survey data for the year 
2010 to compare the poverty level in each of twenty-one Croatian counties with that at the 
national level and decompose these differences into the contributions of the mean income and 
income inequality.  
It should be stressed here that we do not deal with the absolute poverty, commonly 
understood as the lack of an absolute amount of material resources (generally, income) required 
to satisfy a set of basic human needs. Instead, we deal with poverty in a relative sense. In 
particular, we are concerned with people who may not be truly, genuinely poor, but rather with 
those who are said to be at risk of poverty.2 Being at risk of poverty does not necessarily imply 
being seriously materially deprived in the sense of lacking income required to be, say, well 
nourished. According to Eurostat’s glossary3, for an individual to be tagged as at-risk-of-poverty, 
it suffices that (s)he commands income “below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 
60% of the national median equivalized disposable income after social transfers”. The European 
                                                 
2 These, of course, include the genuinly poor as well, if any. 
3 Statistics Explained (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/). 
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Commission uses the so-called at-risk-of-poverty rate, defined as the share of total population 
that is at risk of poverty, as one of its social indicators (see, e.g., Atkinson and Marlier 2010). So 
defined, this indicator is obviously equivalent to the poverty rate, also known as the headcount 
poverty ratio or poverty incidence, with the poverty line is relative,4 equal to 60 percent of the 
equivalized median income. In our empirical analysis, we decompose the regional differences in 
the at-risk-of-poverty incidence into the portions attributed to the differences in the mean 
equivalized income and inequality of its distribution.  
 Selecting one poverty5 measure instead of another is a normative choice which can, in 
principle, affect the results of the analysis. In order to check the robustness of our results, we also 
consider two measures other than the poverty headcount ratio, namely the poverty gap (also 
known as poverty depth) and the squared poverty gap (also known as poverty severity). All three 
indicators belong to the so-called FGT class of poverty measures introduced by Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke (1984) and are commonly used in the poverty decomposition literature.6  
 The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The decomposition framework is presented 
in section 2. Then, in section 3, the three poverty measures we use are described. In section 4, we 
describe the Household Budget Survey data. Section 5 contains some descriptive evidence on 
poverty, the mean income and inequality across the twenty-one Croatian counties. In section 6 we 
give the results of decompositions and discuss them. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Unlike an absolute poverty line, whose real value is fixed over time and as such independent of distributional 
changes, a relative poverty line is dependent upon the income distribution, for it is usually set equal to a proportion 
of the mean or the median income. 
5 For expositional simplicity, throughout the rest of the paper we will drop the prefix "at-risk-of-" and refer just to 
"poverty". This does not entail any conceptual changes.  
6 Exact formal definitions of these measures will be given later. 
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2  Decomposition framework 
We use the decomposition framework pioneered by Kakwani and Subbarao (1990) and Jain and 
Tendulkar (1990), and afterwards more rigorously analyzed by Datt and Ravallion (1992), 
Kakwani (2000) and Shorrocks (2011). They all used it in intertemporal settings, namely to 
decompose the poverty change between two years into what they call the “growth” and 
“redistribution” contributions. The framework can, however, be equally well used in spatial 
settings, that is, to decompose the difference in poverty between two countries or regions7 at a 
given year (see Kolenikov and Shorrocks 2005; Dhondge 2005). For spatial applications, the 
growth and redistribution contributions should be appropriately renamed. Kolenikov and 
Shorrocks (2005) use the terms "income" instead of "growth" and "inequality" instead of 
"redistribution", and in this paper we will use this terminology as well. The renaming seems 
obvious enough: while the terms "growth" and "redistribution" are suggestive of a dynamic 
nature of applications in intertemporal settings, the terms "income" and "inequality" reflect on the 
other hand a static nature of spatial applications.     
Consider two regions, indexed by { }1,2r∈ . The poverty level in region r , denoted by rP
, is a function of the income vector 1( ,..., ,..., )y
rr r r r n
i ny y y= ∈? , and the fixed8  poverty line 
z ++∈R :  
( , )y rrP P z= .                                                                                                                     (1) 
Since our aim is to decompose the difference in poverty between two regions into the 
contributions of the differences in mean incomes and inequality levels, it is useful to rewrite (1) 
as 
                                                 
7 Or any other spatial units that one finds appropriate. 
8 That is, the poverty line is te same for both regions, 1 2z z z= = . 
6 
 
 ( , )πr r rP P μ= ,                                                                                                                   (2) 
where we use the fact that any income distribution y r  is fully characterized by its mean rμ  and 
the parameters of the Lorenz curve, denoted by the vector πr . Also, since the poverty line is the 
same for both regions, we drop it for the sake of notational simplicity. Poverty difference 
between the two regions is then expressed as 
 2 1 2 2 1 1( , ) ( , )π πP P P P Pμ μΔ = − = − .                                                                                 (3) 
 Since the poverty line is fixed, a given difference in poverty can be only due to the 
difference in the mean income, 2 1μ μ μΔ = − , or due to the difference in the level of inequality, 
2 1π π πΔ = − . The portion of PΔ  that comes from the difference in mean incomes, with 
inequality fixed at the level in the reference region (either of the two)9, is called the pure income 
effect (contribution), and the portion that is due to the difference in the level of inequality, with 
the mean income fixed at the reference region’s level, is the pure inequality effect 
(contribution).10  
If we take region 1 as the reference region, that is, if we fix inequality at its level in region 
1, the corresponding income effect, G1, is formally defined as follows: 
1 2 1 1 1( , ) ( , )π πG P Pμ μ= − .                                                                                                 (4) 
By the same token, fixing the mean income at the level of region 1, the inequality effect, I1, is 
given by 
1 1 2 1 1( , ) ( , )π πI P Pμ μ= − .                                                                                                  (5)  
                                                 
9 To be precise, the reference can be chosen completely arbitrarily, meaning that it can be any region other than the 
two being compared. Indeed, the reference need not be observed in reality; that is, it can be fully artificial. However. 
the latter possibility, although logically perfectly legitimate does not seem to be defensible on intuitive grounds. 
10 The adjective “pure” is to be understood as “ceteris paribus”. In the remainder of the paper, we will drop it and 
call the effects “income effect” and “inequality effect”. We will also use the words “effect” and “contribution” 
interchangeably throughout the paper.   
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Choosing region 2 instead of region 2 as the reference is, however, no less legitimate. The 
corresponding income and inequality effects are, respectively, 
 2 2 2 1 2( , ) ( , )π πG P Pμ μ= − ,                                                                                                (6) 
and 
2 2 2 2 1( , ) ( , )π πI P Pμ μ= − .                                                                                                 (7) 
Generally, there is no a priori reason why choosing one region as the reference would be 
better than choosing the other, and the choice is therefore fully arbitrary. Datt and Ravallion 
(1992) noticed that if the function P is not additively separable11 in the mean income and the 
level of inequality, the income and inequality effects computed with one region as the reference 
are not equal to those computed with the other region as the reference. And since poverty 
measures generally are not additively separable, the implication is that whichever region is 
chosen as the reference, the resulting decomposition will be inexact in the sense that, besides the 
income and inequality effects, there will also be a residual, R, equal to the difference between the 
income (or inequality) effects computed for different choices of the reference region. For 
example, taking 1r = , one gets the decomposition 
 1 1 1P G I RΔ = + + ,                                                                                                              (8) 
where 1 2 1 2 1R G G I I= − = − . It is easy to check that for 2r =  the corresponding residual is 
2 1R R= − . In their empirical application, Datt and Ravallion (1992) found that the residual is not 
negligible: indeed, in some cases it accounted for even 50 percent of PΔ . 
 It is important to realize at this point that the existence of the residual, irrespective of its 
size, is not a consequence of leaving out some components other than the differences in the mean 
                                                 
11 A function is additively separable in its arguments if its first order derivative with respect to any of the arguments 
is not a function of any of its other arguments; in other words, if all its cross partial derivatives are zero. For 
example, the function ( , )f u v  is additively separable in  u  and  v  if 
2 / 0f u v∂ ∂ ∂ = .  
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incomes and inequality levels, but rather a pure accounting failure. In other words, the residual 
must be fully comprised of those parts of the true income and inequality effects that are not 
properly accounted for by choosing either region as the reference. This is implied by the fact that, 
once we fix the poverty line, the differences in the mean incomes and levels of inequality must be 
the only sources of the difference in poverty between two regions.12 
 That said, in order to solve the issue of residual, one may proceed in one of two different 
ways. One involves trying to better approximate the income and inequality effects. This is done 
in Bresson (2008a, 2008b) who used a decomposition procedure based on integral calculus, 
proposed recently by Müller (2008). Alternatively, one may decide to apportion the residual 
between the income and inequality effects in a certain way. It is a common practice in the 
decomposition literature that the residual be divided between the two effects so that each of them 
gets one half of it. In the present paper, we will also pursue this common practice.    
There are two justifications for such "fifty-fifty" division rule. Kakwani (2000) proposed 
an axiomatic decomposition framework based on the following axioms: (i) if one of the effects is 
zero, the total poverty difference must be equal to the other effect; (ii) if both effects are (weakly) 
positive/negative, the total poverty difference must be (weakly) positive/negative; (iii) the income 
and inequality effects obtained in the decomposition of 2 1P P PΔ = − , must be of the same 
absolute magnitude, but of the opposite sign, as those obtained in the decomposition of 
1 2P P P−Δ = − . These axioms are shown to imply that the two effects should be calculated by 
averaging their values obtained with different reference regions. Therefore, the income and 
inequality effects are, respectively, 
                                                 
12 For decompositions where the poverty line is also allowed to vary, and thus can be an additional source of poverty 
differences, see, for example, Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2000, 2005) and Deutsch and Silber (2011). 
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[ ] [ ]1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 21 1 1 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )2 2 2 2π π π πG G G P P P Pμ μ μ μ= + = − + −             (9) 
and 
[ ] [ ]1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 11 1 1 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )2 2 2 2π π π πI I I P P P Pμ μ μ μ= + = − + − .           (10) 
By rearranging (9) and (10), one can show that  G  and  I  contain a half of the residual each, so 
that the following equalities hold: 
 1 1 2 2
1 1
2 2
G G R G R= + = + ,                                                                                      (11) 
 1 1 2 2
1 1
2 2
I I R I R= + = + .                                                                                         (12) 
The expressions (9) and (10) are also derived by Shorrocks (2011) in a decomposition 
framework based on the Shapley value. The Shapley value is a concept imported from 
cooperative game theory, and it indicates the portion of total output that each player in a 
cooperative game is to be given. It is equal to the average marginal contribution of a player to all 
possible coalitions (s)he can form with other players (Shapley 1953).13 In a "decomposition 
game", there are two "players", namely the effects of income and inequality, and the "output" is 
the total poverty difference. It turns out that the Shapley values of the income and inequality 
effects are given by (9) and (10), respectively.      
In the expressions (9) and (10), four different poverty levels appear. Two of them are 
always observed from the data: 1 1( , )πP μ  is the level of poverty in region 1, and 2 2( , )πP μ  in 
region 2. The remaining two, 1 2( , )πP μ  and 2 1( , )πP μ , are unobserved. The former corresponds 
to the counterfactual income distribution whose mean is equal to that in the income distribution 
of region 1, 1y , and whose Lorenz curve is identical to that in the income distribution of region 2, 
                                                 
13 For an overview of the Shapley value, see Hart (2008).  
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2y . For the latter poverty level, it is exactly the other way around: it measures poverty 
corresponding to the distribution with the mean income and the Lorenz curve equal to those in 
the distributions 2y  and 
1y , respectively.  
The two counterfactual distributions are easily constructed using the fact that the 
inequality level in a given income distribution is scale invariant, that is, it does not change when 
all incomes get multiplied by the same number. It follows then that the counterfactual distribution 
with mean 1μ  and the Lorenz curve parameters 2π  is the distribution ( ) 211 yg+ ⋅ , where 
2 1
1
g μ μμ
−=
 
is the relative difference between the two regions' mean incomes. Similarly, the 
counterfactual distribution characterized by 2μ  and 1π  is the distribution 1(1 ) yg+ ⋅ . Using the 
notation for the poverty measure as in (1), the Shapley income and inequality effects are 
expressed as, respectively, 
( )( )1 1 2 2111 1((1 ) , ) ( , ) ( , )2 2y y y ygG P g z P z P z P += + ⋅ − + − ⋅⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦                  (13) 
and                                  
( )( )2 1 2 1111 1, ( , ) ( , ) ((1 ) , )2 2y y y ygI P z P z P z P g z+= ⋅ − + − + ⋅⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ .             (14) 
These two formulas will be used in the decomposition exercise that we perform in the remainder 
of the paper.   
 
3  Poverty measures 
As mentioned in the introduction, we use three poverty measures that are commonly used in the 
decomposition literature, as well as in the empirical literature on poverty measurement in general. 
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They all belong to the so-called FGT class of measures, introduced by Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke (1984). In this section we define them formally.  
For a discreste income distribution y of size n,14 a poverty measure from the FGT class is 
given by 
 
1
1( , ) max ,0y
n
i
i
z yFGT z
n z
α
α
=
−⎛ ⎞⎧ ⎫= ⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎩ ⎭⎝ ⎠∑ ,                                                                          (15) 
where α  is a non-negative parameter, usually interpreted as indicating the degree of “poverty 
aversion”. By changing the value of α , one obtains different poverty measures which capture 
different aspects of poverty. The three measures that we use correspond to 0α = , 1α =  and 
2α = .  
For 0α = , (15) headcount poverty ratio or poverty incidence – the percentage (hence 
multiplication by 100) of total population below the poverty line: 
 
0
0
1
1( , ) max ,0y
n
i
i
z yFGT z
n z=
−⎛ ⎞⎧ ⎫= ⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎩ ⎭⎝ ⎠∑ .                                                                           (16) 
With 1α = , (15) gives another common poverty measure – the poverty gap or poverty 
depth: 
1
1
1( , ) max ,0y
n
i
i
z yFGT z
n z=
−⎧ ⎫= ⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∑ .                                                                                 (17) 
It measures the average shortfall of the poor people’s incomes from the poverty line, expressed as 
a percentage of the poverty line, where the average is taken over the whole population of the 
region, not just over the population below the poverty line. Alternatively, one may understand it 
as a “weighted headcount ratio”, where the relative gap ( ) /iz y z−  is the weight assigned to 
                                                 
14 For the sake of notational simplicity, in this section we drop the superscript r, indicating region, from the income 
vector yr and its size nr. 
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individual i. This interpretation makes clear that, in comparison with the headcount ratio, the 
poverty gap gives more weight to poorer people. In other words, not all individuals below the 
poverty line contribute equally to the aggregate poverty: the poorer the person, the more it 
contributes to the aggregate poverty. It can also be shown that the functional relation between the 
poverty gap and the headcount ratio is 1 0( , ) ( , ) ( ) /y y zFGT z FGT z z zμ= ⋅ − , where zμ  is the 
average income of people below the poverty line z in distribution y. It follows that for two 
distributions with the same headcount ratio, the one in which the average of the poor is higher, 
and therefore closer to the poverty line, will have lower poverty measured by the poverty gap.  
The last poverty measure that we use is obtained by setting 2α = , which gives us the 
squared poverty gap or poverty severity: 
 
2
2
1
1( , ) max ,0y
n
i
i
z yFGT z
n z=
−⎛ ⎞⎧ ⎫= ⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎩ ⎭⎝ ⎠∑  .                                                                          (18) 
In comparison with the poverty gap, relative shortfalls of individual incomes from the poverty 
line are here squared, meaning that these shortfalls are weighted by themselves. Unlike the 
headcount ratio and the poverty gap, this measure is sensitive to income inequality among the 
poor. This can be seen from the fact that it can be expressed as 
( ) ( )2 22 0( , ) ( , ) 1z zz zz zFGT z FGT z μ μ ρ− −⎡ ⎤= ⋅ + − ⋅⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦y y , where ρ  is the coefficient of variation of 
incomes below the poverty line, measuring thus inequality among the poor (Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke 1984; Ravallion 1994).15 So, if two regions have the same poverty gap, the one with 
more unequal incomes among the poor will have more poverty according to this measure. This 
                                                 
15 Later on, when we present decomposition results for the squared poverty gap, we report inequality below the 
poverty line across the twenty-one counties (Figure 8), but we use a more conventional measure of inequality, the 
Gini coeffeicient, instead of the coefficient of variation. The former can be shown to be an increasing function of the 
latter (Milanović 1997): ( , ) / 3Gini corr y ryρ= ⋅ , where ry is the rank of income y when incomes are ordered 
from the lowest to the highest, and ( , )corr ⋅ ⋅  is the coefficient of correlation. 
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does not mean that the headcount ratio and the poverty gap are not sensitive to overall inequality; 
they are sensitive to the measure of inequality for the whole population, but not to inequality of 
incomes below the poverty line. Just like the poverty gap, the squared poverty gap can also be 
understood as a “weighted headcount ratio”, with the squared gap, 2(( ) / )iz y z− , being used as 
the weight of person i. Thus, this measure gives greater weight to the poorest among the poor.16  
 
4  Data    
The empirical analysis in this paper is based upon the household micro data from the nationally 
representative Household Budget Survey (HBS) for 2010. The survey is conducted on a yearly 
basis by the Croatian Bureau of Statistics (in Croatian: Državni zavod za statistiku) in accordance 
with methodological recommendations of the Eurostat. It contains data on household 
expenditures, income sources and various socioeconomic characteristics.  
 The unit of observation in our empirical analysis is an individual. His or her individual 
living standard is measured by the household income per adult equivalent. Total household 
income is adjusted using the modified OECD equivalence scale (Hagenaars, De Vos, and Zaidi 
1994). This equivalence scale accounts for household composition by assigning the following 
weights to household members: 1 to the household head, 0.5 to each additional adult, and 0.3 to 
each child, where a person is considered to be a child if (s)he is aged 14 or less.   
Regarding the sampling design of the HBS, it is a two-step stratified sample, the twenty-
one counties being the strata. In total, there are 9,631 individuals living in 3,461 households, 
                                                 
16 As α  becomes bigger, the corresponding FGT measures get increasingly more sensitive to the incomes at the very 
bottom of the distribution. In the limit, as α  approaches infinity, one obtains a “Rawlsian” poverty measure (Rawls 
1971) which considers only the poorest person in the distribution. Comparing poverty levels between two 
distributions then amounts to comparing the income gap of the poorest person in one region with that of the poorest 
person in the other region or, equivalently, comparing incomes of the poorest persons in the respective distributions.  
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which is about 0.23 percent of the total population. The response rate at the household level is 61 
percent.17 Unfortunately, for confidentiality reasons, the Croatian Bureau of Statistics does not 
provide data users with information on which household belongs to which of the 650 clusters, so 
that we cannot account for clustering in computing the standard errors of our estimates. In all 
estimations we apply the set of individual weights. 
 
5  Poverty, income and inequality across counties   
Before turning to decomposition of regional poverty differences into the mean income and 
inequality components, here we first present some descriptive figures on poverty, average income 
and inequality for the twenty-one counties considered. These are given in Table 1.  
-- TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE -- 
 Let us start with the poverty measures. Panels A, B and C of Figure 1 show the headcount 
ratios (FGT0), the poverty gaps (FGT1) and the squared poverty gaps (FGT2), respectively, from 
Table 1. The poverty line is set to 60 percent of the median equivalized annual income for 
Croatia as a whole and equals 25,260 Croatian kuna (about 3,420 euros).18 The headcount ratio 
ranges from below 10 percent in Istria, City of Zagreb, Dubrovnik-Neretva, Primorje-Gorski 
Kotar and Krapina-Zagorje, to more than 45 percent in Karlovac and Virovitica-Podravina. The 
figure for Croatia as a whole is 17.719, with eight counties below that level and thirteen above it. 
The former comprise more than half of the total population (about 56 percent), a consequence of 
three biggest cities being located within these counties: Zagreb (coincides with City of Zagreb), 
                                                 
17 For more details on the sampling design, see CBS (2012).  
18 According to the average EUR/HRK exchange rate in 2010. 
19 It should be said that this figure is lower than the official one, 20.6, published by the Croatian Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS 2012). The likely reason is that the official figure is based on different data, namely the Household Income 
Survey data, which are fully compatible with the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC). These data are still unavailable for research purposes outside the Croatian Bureau of Statistics. 
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Split (in Split-Dalmatia) and Rijeka (in Primorje-Gorski Kotar). Most other counties have 
headcount ratios between 10 and 30 percent. 
-- FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE -- 
 As for the FGT1, at the national level it is 6.1 percent, meaning that at the aggregate level 
the average20 shortfall of poor people’s incomes from the poverty line is 6.1 percent. Now that 
more weight is given to poorer among the poor, thirteen counties (comprising about 66 percent of 
total population) are below that figure. Of these thirteen counties, seven are those that also have 
the headcount ratio below the national level. This indicates that in five counties that have higher 
share of the poor than Croatia as a whole, the poverty gap is higher income compared to that for 
Croatia as a whole. Or, in other words, the average poor person’s income in each of these five 
counties is closer to the poverty line than income of the average poor person in the whole 
country. Similarly, using the FGT2 to measure poverty, one can give even more weight to poorer 
among the poor. In this case, in comparison to what we had when the FGT1 was used, one 
additional county becomes better ranked than Croatia as a whole. 
Besides the rerankings of counties relative to the whole Croatia, induced by switching 
from one poverty measure to another, there are also many rerankings among counties relative to 
each other. These are shown in Table 2, where the rankings are made so that lower ranks mean 
lower poverty. We see that no county is equally ranked by all three poverty measures. Although a 
number of rerankings, especially small ones, are likely due to imprecision of the estimates, some 
of them are certainly too big to be explained this way. For instance, Dubrovnik-Neretva is ranked 
third by the FGT0, eighth by the FGT1 and eighteenth by the FGT2. An opposite example is 
Požega-Slavonija whose rank, upon switching from the FGT0 to the FGT1, declines from 
                                                 
20 Recall from section 3 that the average is taken over the whole population, not just over those below the poverty 
line. 
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eighteenth to sixth place. This non-robustness of poverty rankings to switching from one poverty 
measure to another suggests that the character of poverty is different across counties: the fact that 
one county has higher poverty than another when poverty is measured by the FGT0 does not 
necessarily mean that this is so when the other two measures are used. As we will see later on, 
this will also affect the results of decomposition of poverty differences into the mean income and 
inequality components. 
-- TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE -- 
Concerning the average equivalized income, it varies from 66 percent of the national 
average in Karlovac to 127 percent in Istra. In 15 counties, populated by about 57 percent of total 
population, the average income is below the national level. Expectedly, correlation with each of 
the poverty measures is negative, as shown on Figure 2. The correlation with the poverty 
headcount ratio (panel A) is stronger than with the other two measures (panels B and C), 
suggesting that the average income is better at predicting the share of people below the poverty 
line than at predicting the average shortfall of incomes from the poverty line, be it squared or not. 
To this point, note that of all the counties with the mean income below the national mean only 
two have their headcount ratios below the national level. And all the counties whose mean 
income is above the national level are also less poor, according to the headcount ratio, than the 
nation as a whole.     
-- FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE -- 
 As regards income inequality, the Gini coefficient ranges from 20.4 in Požega-Slavonija 
to 42.1 in Karlovac. For Croatia as a whole, it is 29.3, with fifteen counties having less unequal 
income distribution. On Figure 3, we observe positive relationships between the Gini coefficient 
and all three poverty measures, indicating that counties with more unequal income distributions 
tend to have higher poverty as well. Contrary to what we had in the case of average income, the 
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Gini coefficient is correlated more strongly with FGT1 and FGT2 than with FGT0. In other words, 
it is better at predicting the average shortfall of incomes from the poverty line than at predicting 
the share of individuals below the poverty line. The same can be concluded by observing that if 
poverty is measured by FGT1 or FGT2, almost all the counties with income distribution less 
unequal than the national distribution are also less poor than the nation as a whole, which is not 
the case when FGT0 is used.  
-- FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE – 
 
6  Decomposition results 
In this section we present the results of decompositions of regional poverty differences. For the 
sake of expositional simplicity, regional decompositions are performed in the following way. 
Rather than computing the income and inequality effects of regional poverty differences for each 
pair of counties, which would be cumbersome given that there are 210 pairs, we take Croatia as a 
whole to be the benchmark "region" and compare each of the twenty-one counties with the 
national benchmark.21 In all decompositions Croatia as a whole will be treated as region 1. 
Referring to the formulae (13) and (14) from the previous section, 1y  is the income vector for 
Croatia as a whole, while 2y  is the vector of incomes for any of the twenty-one counties.  
Note that even if we chose to decompose the poverty differences between each pair of 
counties, it would nevertheless be warranted to complement such analysis with what we actually 
do here. The reason is that the approach we have chosen seems to be more policy relevant, for it 
provides one with evidence which may be of help while deciding on whether some region-
                                                 
21 The results of 210 pairwise decompositions are available upon request. 
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specific policies for poverty reduction would be more purposeful than policies designed for the 
whole country.    
 
6.1  Results for the headcount poverty 
We first present the results for the case where poverty is measured by the headcount ratio, FGT0. 
The estimates of poverty differences, along with the income and inequality contributions are 
given in Table 3 and graphed on Figure 4. 
-- TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE -- 
-- FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE -- 
To illustrate how the estimated figures should be interpreted, let us take City of Zagreb as 
an example. City of Zagreb is the nation's capital and a county on its own. With the mean income 
22 percent above the national level, it is one of the most affluent counties; there is only one 
county, namely Istra, with higher mean income. As far as income inequality is concerned, the 
Gini coefficient of 27.9 is below the one for Croatia as a whole, and in comparison to the Ginis 
for all the twenty-one counties, 27.9 is the median value. The figure -9.9 in Table 3 means that 
the headcount ratio is 9.9 percentage points lower in City of Zagreb than at the national level. 
This total difference in poverty is decomposed into the income and inequality contributions, 
equal to -6.6 and -3.3, respectively. In Table 4, we show exactly how these two figures are 
computed. 
-- TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE -- 
If one takes the whole country as the reference (column (i)), applying formulas (4) and (5) 
gives, respectively, G1 = -6.4 (income effect) and I1 = -3.1 (inequality effect). G1 = -6.4 (I1 = -3.1) 
is interpreted as follows: if income inequality (the mean income) in City of Zagreb rose (fell) to 
the level for Croatia as a whole, holding at the same time the mean income (income inequality) 
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unchanged, the headcount ratio would be 6.4 (3.1) percentage points lower for City of Zagreb 
than for the whole country. One can analogously interpret G2 = -6.8 and I2 = -3.5 (column (ii)), 
obtained using formulas (6) and (7), respectively. In column (iii), the Shapley value-based 
income effect G = -6.6 is obtained by averaging G1 and G2 (formula (9)), and the Shapley value-
based inequality effect I = -3.3 by averaging I1 and I2 (formula (10)). The effects are of the same 
sign – both are negative – meaning that they reinforce one another in reducing the headcount 
ratio in City of Zagreb below that for the entire country. In a qualitative sense, this result was 
expected and could have been predicted on the base of Table 1: the mean income is notably 
higher and the Gini coefficient is lower in City of Zagreb than in Croatia as a whole.  
Another example of a county where the two effects reinforce each other is Karlovac. 
Here, however, both the income and inequality effects are positive, equal to 19 and 9 percentage 
points, respectively, so that the total excess of the headcount ratio in Karlovac over the national 
one is 28 percentage points. Again, such result could have been guessed by referring to Table 1 
which shows that Karlovac has lower mean income and more unequal income distribution than 
the nation as a whole.  
Finally, take the example of Požega-Slavonija where the effects work against each other: 
the headcount ratio in this county would be 17.4 percentage points above the national level if 
there were no inequality effect of the opposite sign which partly offsets the income effect. On net, 
the two effects yield the headcount ratio for Požega-Slavonija which is 10.6 percentage points 
higher than that for Croatia as a whole. Again, since the mean income in this county is lower than 
the national mean income and that its income distribution is more unequal than that for the entire 
country (see Table 1), it comes as no surprise that the income and inequality effects work against 
one another. 
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In Table 3 and Figure 4, counties are ordered from the least poor to the poorest. The total 
poverty difference, relative to Croatia as a whole, ranges from -13.8 for Istra as the least poor 
county to 29.8 for the poorest county, Virovitica-Podravina. Only differences greater than 5 
percentage points in absolute value – thirteen out of twenty-one – are statistically different from 
zero at the 5 percent level. Regarding the income and inequality effects, note first that in most 
decompositions (thirteen out of twenty-one) the two effects have the same sign. This is more 
pronounced if we consider only the cases in which both effects are statistically different from 
zero: out of eleven such cases, in eight the effects are of the same sign. Among these eight cases, 
four are the least poor counties (Istra, City of Zagreb, Dubrovnik-Neretva, Primorje-Gorski 
Kotar, Krapina-Zagorje), three are the poorest counties (Sisak-Moslavina, Karlovac, Virovitica-
Podravina), with only one between the extremes (Koprivnica-Križevci). This indicates that the 
income and inequality effects tend to reinforce one another, rather than operating in opposite 
directions, especially in most and least poor counties. A reason for this pattern lies in negative 
correlation between the mean income and inequality: on average, poorer counties have also more 
unequal income distributions.22 Counties where the two effects are of opposite signs tend to be 
those with poverty levels that are not significantly different from the national level (e.g., Split-
Dalmacija, Zagreb, Bjelovar-Bilogora, Varaždin): obviously enough, statistically significant 
income and inequality effects must operate against each other to yield an insignificant total 
poverty difference.   
Comparing the absolute values of the two effects, we observe that in most cases (fifteen 
out of twenty-one) the income effect dominates the inequality effect. Of the six counties for 
which the opposite holds, that is, where the inequality effect dominates, five of them are less poor 
                                                 
22 Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2005), who decomposed poverty differences between Russian regions, found the 
opposite: poorer regions tend to have lower inequality. 
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than Croatia as a whole. In addition, among the fifteen counties where the income effect 
dominates, dominance is on average greater for poorer counties. This is in accordance with the 
fact that the negative correlation between FGT0 and the average income (Figure 2, panel A) is 
stronger than the positive correlation between FGT0 and the Gini coefficient (Figure 3, panel A). 
Another way to show this is by plotting total poverty change against the income and inequality 
contributions. Figure 5 shows that positive correlation with the total poverty change with the 
income contribution (panel A) is higher than with the inequality contribution (panel B). Thus, 
when poverty is measured by the headcount ratio, regional differences in the mean income are 
better than regional inequality differences at predicting poverty differences. 
-- FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE -- 
One can conclude that when poverty is measured by the headcount ratio, that is, by the 
proportion of population below the poverty line, the income contribution to total poverty 
differences generally dominates the inequality contribution. Although there are cases in which the 
inequality contribution is dominant, those are rather rare. This result seems to confirm to some 
extent the conventional intuition that the main determinant of poverty in a region within a country 
is that region's average income as an indicator of the average living standard. However, despite 
the domination of the income contribution, the size of the inequality contribution is not small 
enough to be neglected. In most of the twenty-one counties, the contribution of inequality to the 
difference in their poverty relative to national poverty is of a significant magnitude. Moreover, 
there seems to exist a clear pattern: counties with higher average income also tend to have more 
equal income distribution.     
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6.2  Results for the poverty gap 
After decomposing differences in the headcount ratio (FGT0), here we perform decomposition of 
the poverty gap (FGT1). The estimates are displayed in Table 5 and Figure 6. Interpretation of the 
figures follows the logic explained in Table 4, the only difference being that here poverty is 
measured by FGT1 instead of by FGT0.  
-- TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE -- 
-- FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE -- 
As already noted in section 4, when we switch from FGT0 to FGT1, many counties change their 
poverty ranking relative to the national benchmark, as well as relative to one another. While in 
the case of FGT0 eight counties were less poor than the nation as a whole, now that poverty is 
measured by FGT1 there are thirteen such counties. Seven of them are the same counties as in the 
case of FGT0 (Istra, Krapina-Zagorje, City of Zagreb, Primorje-Gorski Kotar, Međimurje, 
Zagreb, Dubrovnik-Neretva), while the remaining six are "newcomers" (Požega-Slavonija, Zadar, 
Varaždin, Osijek-Baranja, Lika-Senj, Koprivnica-Križevci). Of these six, five are only 
insignificantly poorer than the entire country, just as they were so in the case of FGT0 (the only 
exception being Koprivnica-Križevci). The only newcomer county that is now significantly 
poorer than the national benchmark is Požega-Slavonija. It changes rank from eighteen to six, 
that is, advances from the group of poorest to the group of least poor counties. There is only one 
county, Split-Dalmacija, that becomes poorer than Croatia as a whole, though not significantly 
so. 
Considering the estimates of the income and inequality effects, note first that income 
component for each of the counties is proportional to its value in the benchmark where poverty 
was measured by FGT0. Indeed, in Figure 7 (panel A), where income contributions for FGT0 are 
plotted against those for FGT1, the coefficient of correlation is very high, 0.97. Regressing the 
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income contribution for FGT0 on the income contribution for FGT1, the slope coefficient is 
slightly greater than three (3.07), and the intercept is very close to zero, showing that the factor of 
proportionality between the two income components is about three. In the case of the inequality 
component, correlation is lower, 0.80 (Figure 7, panel B). This suggests that upon switching from 
FGT0 to FGT1 the inequality contributions change on average relatively more than the income 
contributions, so much so that we now have more counties where the inequality contribution 
dominates in absolute value the income contribution. While in the case of FGT0 there were only 
six such counties, now that we have switched to FGT1 there are thirteen out of twenty-one. Thus, 
one can conclude that by using FGT1 instead of FGT0, that is, by giving more weight to poorer 
among the poor, the inequality contribution to regional poverty differences becomes on average 
more important than the income contribution. This is expected since, as we already showed, the 
Gini coefficient is correlated more strongly with FGT0 (Figure 2, panel B) than with FGT1 
(Figure 3, panel B).  
-- FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE -- 
Regarding the signs of the income and inequality contributions, they are generally 
preserved. The sign of the income contribution must be preserved by definition, for if a county's 
mean income is below (above) the national mean income, the income component will be positive 
(negative), irrespective of the poverty measure used. This need not be so for the inequality 
contribution. However, in our case we observe sign reversals only in cases where the inequality 
contribution for FGT0 or that for FGT1 (or both) is not statistically different from zero.   
 
6.3  Results for the squared poverty gap          
 The last poverty measure we consider is the squared poverty gap, FGT2, which assigns 
even more weight to poorer among the poor than FGT1. As we said in section 3, unlike FGT0 
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which accounts only for the proportion of the population below the poverty line, and unlike FGT1 
for which only the average relative shortfall of incomes from the poverty line is important, FGT2 
is sensitive to inequality of incomes below the poverty line. On Figure 8, which shows the Gini 
coefficients among the poor, we see that inequality of incomes below the poverty line is lowest in 
Požega-Slavonija (6.4) and highest in Dubrovnik-Neretva (47.0). These values depart 
substantially from those for the whole distribution, displayed in the last column of Table 1. Given 
this fact, one can reasonably expect the poverty ranking of Požega-Slavonija to significantly 
improve and that of Dubrovnik-Neretva to worsen now that poverty is measured by FGT2 as a 
measure which accounts for inequality among the poor.  
-- FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE -- 
The estimates of the total poverty differences and the income and inequality contributions 
are given in Table 6 and Figure 10. In comparison to what we had when poverty was measured 
by FGT1, the number of counties that are less poor than Croatia as a whole does not change: there 
are again thirteen such counties, five more than when FGT0 was used to measure poverty. 
However, while in the case of FGT1 seven total poverty differences were statistically different 
from zero, now there are twelve of them. There are again many rerankings, and some of them are 
quite remarkable. For example, Dubrovnik-Neretva, which was less poor than the nation as a 
whole according to both FGT0 and FGT1, now becomes poorer than the total population, though 
not significantly so. The worse ranking is a direct consequence of the nature of poverty in this 
county: in comparison the whole country, it has a lower share of people below the poverty line, 
but incomes of the poor are much more unequally distributed. The example of Požega-Slavonija 
should be mentioned again. This county was the fourth poorest county according to FGT0, then it 
became the sixth among least poor counties upon switching from FGT0 to FGT1, and now its 
ranking is improved even more: according to FGT2, only Istra and Krapina-Zagorje are less poor. 
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This indicates that the nature of poverty in Požega-Slavonija is such that there are relatively many 
people below the poverty line, but their incomes do not fall very much short of the poverty line, 
and inequality among the poor is low.  
-- TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE -- 
-- FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE -- 
Turning to the estimates of the income and inequality contributions, the most notable 
result is that the inequality contribution gets even more dominant over the income contribution 
than it was the case with FGT1. While the inequality contribution was dominant for thirteen 
counties when poverty was measured by FGT1, here we have domination for fifteen counties. 
This unsurprising result stems from the already mentioned fact that in addition to inequality in the 
whole distribution, FGT2 is sensitive to inequality of incomes below the poverty line. Correlation 
between the income contributions for FGT2 and FGT0 (Figure 10, panel A) is just a little weaker 
than between the income contributions for FGT1 and FGT0 (Figure 7, panel A): it falls from 0.97 
to 0.93. However, if we compare the correlation between the inequality contributions for FGT2 
and FGT0 (Figure 10, panel B) with the correlation between the inequality contributions for FGT1 
and FGT0 (Figure 7, panel B), we observe a bigger decline: from 0.80 to 0.67. Thus, the switch 
from FGT0 to FGT2 induces strengthening of the inequality contribution, relative to the income 
contribution, more than the switch from FGT0 to FGT1.   
In sum, comparing the results obtained in case where poverty is measured by FGT0 with 
the results obtained by the two alternative poverty measures from the FGT class, a shift in 
dominance from the income toward inequality contribution is clearly observed. The results do not 
come as a surprise, given that the three measures capture different aspects of poverty.       
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7  Summary and concluding remarks 
The existing literature on empirical poverty analysis abounds with decompositions of 
intertemporal poverty differences into the "growth" and "redistribution" components. Although 
the conceptual framework that is commonly used in those decomposition exercises can be equally 
well applied to decompositions of spatial poverty differences, that is, between countries or 
regions within a country, there are surprisingly few studies on this topic. In this paper, we aimed 
at contributing to this literature by studying differences in relative poverty between Croatian 
counties in the year 2010, using the standard decomposition framework based on the Shapley 
value.     
 Utilizing three poverty measures, where each accounts for a different aspect of poverty, 
we showed that the way one measures poverty affects significantly the results of decompositions 
of spatial differences in poverty. For the most common poverty measure, the headcount ratio, the 
results show that regional differences in the average income are the principal determinant of 
regional headcount poverty differences. This, however, does not mean that the inequality 
component should be neglected: although the income contribution is dominant for most of the 
counties, the inequality component is also significant and in some cases even dominates the 
income contribution. The results change substantially when we switch from the headcount ratio 
to the other two measures, namely the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap. First, there are 
many poverty rerankings of counties relative to each other, and some of them change their rank 
quite remarkably, suggesting that the nature of poverty varies across counties. Most importantly, 
unlike in the case of the headcount ratio, the inequality contributions become dominant over the 
income contribution, especially when the squared poverty gap is used to measure poverty. Thus, 
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the results are not robust to the choice of poverty measure due to, as we already said, varying 
nature of poverty across counties.  
 This non-robustness of the results is the most important message regarding policy 
recommendations that could be drawn from the decomposition exercise performed in this paper. 
Before poverty-reduction measures are devised, policy makers should make clear what exactly 
their objective is. Do they aim at lowering the proportion of population below the poverty line 
(reducing the headcount ratio)? Or do they rather wish to bring the poor closer to the poverty line 
(reducing the poverty gap or the squared poverty gap, depending on how much weight is given to 
those at the bottom of distribution)? Once the objective is known, results such as those obtained 
in this paper could be used to see how much of the disparity between a region's and national 
poverty levels is due to the difference in average incomes and how much due to the difference in 
inequality. As can be seen from our results, the contributions of the average income and 
inequality depend to a large extent on the poverty measure used.  
Regarding further research, two avenues are especially worth exploring. First, this paper's 
analysis is just an accounting exercise: we estimate the income and inequality contributions of 
regional poverty differences without going into deeper analyses aimed at understanding the 
economic and broader social forces underlying the results we obtain. More detailed analyses are 
needed if one wants to better grasp the pattern of regional poverty differences and the underlying 
mechanisms, especially so if the results are meant to be a guide for policy making. For example, 
it would be worth exploring sources of variations in the average income and income inequality 
across counties. Such analyses may help to reveal potential levers that poverty-reduction 
programs could rely on. Second, the poverty measures we use are scale-invariant, meaning that 
their values do not change when all incomes and the poverty line are multiplied by the same 
positive number. Alternatively, one may choose translation-invariant measures, whose values do 
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not change when the same number is added to all incomes and the poverty line. By choosing 
scale-invariant poverty measures, we have also implicitly adopted the relative approach to 
inequality, according to which inequality does not change if all incomes are multiplied by the 
same number (i.e., if the ratios of incomes do not change). However, no less legitimate is the 
absolute approach to inequality, according to which inequality does not change if the same 
number is added to all incomes (i.e., if the absolute differences between incomes remain 
unchanged). Bresson and Labar (2007) show that the two approaches give different results which, 
in turn, lead to different recommendations when it comes to policy making.                               
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Tables and figures (ordered as they appear in the text) 
 
Table 1. Basic statistics for the twenty-one counties 
 
Population 
share 
Headcount 
ratio 
(FGT0) 
Poverty 
gap 
(FGT1) 
Squared 
poverty 
gap 
(FGT2) 
Mean  
equivalized  
income  
(CRO=100) 
Gini  
coefficient
Zagreb (ZG) 7.3 16.7 4.2 1.7 106 25.5 
Krapina-Zagorje (KZ) 3.1 9.6 2.1 0.7 100 22.5 
Sisak-Moslavina (SM) 4.1 37.4 19.0 13.2 73 35.9 
Karlovac (KA) 3.0 45.8 25.7 18.6 66 42.1 
Varaždin (VA) 4.1 20.0 5.4 2.4 88 24.9 
Koprivnica-Križevci (KK) 2.8 24.7 6.0 2.2 95 29.1 
Bjelovar-Bilogora (BB) 2.9 19.9 8.2 4.6 86 28.5 
Primorje-Gorski Kotar (PG) 6.9 9.5 2.9 1.7 110 26.2 
Lika-Senj (LS) 1.2 22.7 5.9 2.3 89 24.7 
Virovitica-Podravina (VP) 2.1 47.5 14.7 6.8 69 30.7 
Požega-Slavonija (PS) 1.8 28.3 4.0 0.9 77 20.4 
Brod-Posavina (BP) 3.9 21.3 7.7 3.4 91 29.7 
Zadar (ZD) 3.8 20.7 5.0 2.3 92 27.8 
Osijek-Baranja (OB) 7.4 19.5 5.6 2.3 95 28.7 
Šibenik-Knin (SK) 2.6 27.0 8.4 4.1 90 31.4 
Vukovar-Srijem (VS) 4.4 26.0 7.7 3.3 85 29.5 
Split-Dalmacija (SD) 10.7 16.3 6.4 4.2 96 29.2 
Istra (IS) 4.8 3.9 1.2 0.8 127 24.7 
Dubrovnik-Neretva (DN) 2.9 9.3 4.9 4.2 111 26.4 
Međimurje (ME) 2.6 12.0 3.4 1.5 98 22.4 
City of Zagreb (CZ) 17.7 7.9 2.8 1.6 122 27.9 
Croatia (CRO) 100.0 17.7 6.1 3.4 100 29.3 
Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010.  
Note: Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. 
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Figure 1. Poverty across the twenty-one counties 
 
A. Poverty headcount ratios (FGT0) 
 
B. Poverty gaps (FGT1) 
C. Squared poverty gaps (FGT2) 
Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: On each panel, the estimates are shown as the heights of the circles. The little crosses above and below each 
of the estimates represent the bounds of a 95-percent confidence interval, based on asymptotic standard errors. 
Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. For full names of the counties, see Table 1. 
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Table 2. Poverty rankings for different poverty measures 
 Rank by FGT0 Rank by FGT1 Rank by FGT2 
IS 1 1 1 
CZ 2 3 5 
DN 3 8 18 
PG 4 4 6 
KZ 5 2 1 
ME 6 5 4 
SD 7 15 17 
ZG 8 7 7 
CRO 9 14 15 
OB 10 11 10 
BB 11 18 19 
VA 12 10 12 
ZD 13 9 9 
BP 14 17 14 
LS 15 12 11 
KK 16 13 8 
VS 17 16 13 
SK 18 19 16 
PS 19 6 3 
SM 20 21 21 
KA 21 22 22 
VP 22 20 20 
Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: For each of the three poverty measures, rankings are such that the county with the lowest value of the 
respective poverty measure is ranked as first (rank = 1). Rankings are based the values of the three poverty measures 
given in Table 1. The grey-colored cells in the table indicate equal ranking by different poverty measures. For full 
names of the counties, see Table 1. 
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Figure 2. Correlation between the mean income and the three poverty measures 
 
A. Mean income vs. FGT0 
 
B. Mean income vs. FGT1 
C. Mean income vs. FGT2 
Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. The horizontal (vertical) reference line 
indicates the value of the statistic on the vertical (horizontal) axis for Croatia as a whole. For full names of the 
counties, see Table 1. 
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Figure 3. Correlation between the Gini coefficient and the three poverty measures  
 
A. Gini coefficient vs. FGT0 
 
B. Gini coefficient vs. FGT1 
C. Gini coefficient vs. FGT2 
Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. The horizontal (vertical) reference line 
indicates the value of the statistic on the vertical (horizontal) axis for Croatia as a whole. For full names of the 
counties, see Table 1.  
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Table 3. Decomposition results for the headcount ratio 
Total poverty 
difference (ΔP) 
Income 
contribution (G) 
Inequality 
contribution (I) 
Istra (IS) -13.8 -7.8 -6.0 
City of Zagreb (CZ) -9.9 -6.6 -3.3 
Dubrovnik-Neretva (DN) -8.4 -4.1 -4.3 
Primorje-Gorski Kotar (PG) -8.2 -3.1 -5.1 
Krapina-Zagorje (KZ) -8.1 -0.1 -8.0 
Međimurje (ME) -5.7 0.4 -6.1 
Split-Dalmacija (SD) -1.4 1.5 -2.9 
Zagreb (ZG) -1.0 -2.2 1.2 
Osijek-Baranja (OB) 1.7 1.5 0.2 
Bjelovar-Bilogora (BB) 2.2 4.6 -2.4 
Varaždin (VA) 2.3 6.8 -4.5 
Zadar (ZD) 3.0 4.6 -1.6 
Brod-Posavina (BP) 3.5 2.5 1.0 
Lika-Senj (LS) 5.0 6.1 -1.1 
Koprivnica-Križevci (KK) 7.0 3.0 4.0 
Vukovar-Srijem (VS) 8.2 6.9 1.3 
Šibenik-Knin (SK) 9.2 5.5 3.7 
Požega-Slavonija (PS) 10.6 17.4 -6.8 
Sisak-Moslavina (SM) 19.7 14.0 5.7 
Karlovac (KA) 28.0 19.0 9.0 
Virovitica-Podravina (VP) 29.8 23.8 6.0 
Source: Own calculation based on the HBS data for 2010. 
Notes: Decomposition is based on the Shapley value approach, using formulas (13) and (14), where the poverty 
measure P is the headcount ratio (FGT0). Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. 
Boldface figures are statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level; statistical significance is assessed based 
on asymptotic standard errors. 
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Figure 4. Decomposition results for the headcount ratio 
Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Decomposition is based on the Shapley value approach, using formulas (13) and (14), where the 
poverty measure P is the headcount ratio (FGT0). Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD 
equivalence scale. For full names of the counties, see Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2
0
-1
0
0
10
20
30
40
IS CZ DN PG KZ ME SD ZG OB BB VA ZD BP LS KK VS SK PS SM KA VP
Inequality contribution (I)
Income contribution (G)
Total poverty difference
38 
 
Table 4. Calculating the income and inequality contributions 
 Reference: 
Croatia as a whole 
Reference: 
City of Zagreb Shapley value approach 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
Total poverty 
difference ΔP = -9.9 ΔP = -9.9 ΔP = -9.9 
Income 
contribution G1 = -6.4 G2 = -6.8 G = 0.5 · (-6.4) + 0.5 · (-6.8) = -6.6 
Inequality 
contribution I1 = -3.1 I2 = -3.5 I = 0.5 · (-3.1) + 0.5 · (-3.5) = -3.3 
Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget survey data for 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
Figure 5. Correlation between the total difference in the headcount ratio and the income 
and inequality contributions 
 
A. Total poverty change vs. income 
contribution 
 
B. Total poverty change vs. inequality 
contribution 
Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. For full names of the counties, see 
Table 1. 
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Table 5. Decomposition results for the poverty gap 
 
Total poverty 
difference (ΔP) 
Income contribution 
(G) 
Inequality 
contribution (I) 
Istra (IS) -4.9 -1.8 -3.2 
Krapina-Zagorje (KZ) -4.0 0.0 -4.0 
City of Zagreb (CZ) -3.3 -1.7 -1.6 
Primorje-Gorski Kotar (PG) -3.2 -0.9 -2.3 
Međimurje (ME) -2.7 0.2 -2.8 
Požega-Slavonija (PS) -2.1 3.7 -5.9 
Zagreb (ZG) -1.9 -0.7 -1.2 
Dubrovnik-Neretva (DN) -1.2 -0.9 -0.3 
Zadar (ZD) -1.1 1.1 -2.2 
Varaždin (VA) -0.7 1.6 -2.3 
Osijek-Baranja (OB) -0.5 0.7 -1.2 
Lika-Senj (LS) -0.2 1.6 -1.8 
Koprivnica-Križevci (KK) -0.1 0.7 -0.8 
Split-Dalmacija (SD) 0.3 0.4 -0.1 
Brod-Posavina (BP) 1.5 1.3 0.2 
Vukovar-Srijem (VS) 1.6 2.3 -0.7 
Bjelovar-Bilogora (BB) 2.1 1.8 0.3 
Šibenik-Knin (SK) 2.3 1.5 0.8 
Virovitica-Podravina (VP) 8.6 7.6 1.0 
Sisak-Moslavina (SM) 12.8 5.1 7.7 
Karlovac (KA) 19.6 7.6 12.0 
Source: Own calculation based on the HBS data for 2010. 
Notes: Decomposition is based on the Shapley value approach, using formulas (13) and (14), where the poverty 
measure P is the poverty gap (FGT1). Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. 
Boldface figures are statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level; statistical significance is assessed based 
on asymptotic standard errors. 
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Figure 6. Decomposition results for the poverty gap 
Source: Own calculation based on the HBS data for 2010. 
Notes: Decomposition is based on the Shapley value approach, using formulas (13) and (14), where the poverty 
measure P is the poverty gap (FGT1). Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. For full 
names of the counties, see Table 1. 
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Figure 7. Correlation between the income contributions and between the inequality 
contributions for FGT0 and FGT1 
 
A. Income contribution for FGT0 vs. income 
contribution for FGT1 
 
B. Inequality contribution for FGT0 vs. 
inequality contribution for FGT1 
Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. For full names of the counties, see 
Table 1. 
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Figure 8. Inequality of incomes below the poverty line 
Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. For full 
names of the counties, see Table 1.  
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Table 6. Decomposition results for the squared poverty gap 
Total poverty 
difference (ΔP) 
Income contribution 
(G) 
Inequality 
contribution (I) 
Istra (IS) -2.7 -0.7 -2.0 
Krapina-Zagorje (KZ) -2.7 0.0 -2.7 
Požega-Slavonija (PS) -2.5 1.3 -3.9 
Međimurje (ME) -2.0 0.1 -2.0 
City of Zagreb (CZ) -1.8 -0.7 -1.1 
Primorje-Gorski Kotar (PG) -1.7 -0.4 -1.3 
Zagreb (ZG) -1.7 -0.3 -1.4 
Koprivnica-Križevci (KK) -1.2 0.3 -1.5 
Zadar (ZD) -1.1 0.4 -1.6 
Osijek-Baranja (OB) -1.1 0.3 -1.4 
Lika-Senj (LS) -1.1 0.7 -1.8 
Varaždin (VA) -1.0 0.7 -1.8 
Vukovar-Srijem (VS) -0.1 1.1 -1.2 
Brod-Posavina (BP) 0.0 0.7 -0.7 
Šibenik-Knin (SK) 0.7 0.7 -0.1 
Dubrovnik-Neretva (DN) 0.8 -0.3 1.1 
Split-Dalmacija (SD) 0.8 0.2 0.6 
Bjelovar-Bilogora (BB) 1.2 0.9 0.3 
Virovitica-Podravina (VP) 3.4 3.6 -0.3 
Sisak-Moslavina (SM) 9.8 2.6 7.2 
Karlovac (KA) 15.2 4.3 10.9 
Source: Own calculation based on the HBS data for 2010. 
Notes: Decomposition is based on the Shapley value approach, using formulas (13) and (14), where the poverty 
measure P is the squared poverty gap (FGT2). Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. 
Boldface figures are statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level; statistical significance is assessed based 
on asymptotic standard errors. 
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Figure 9. Decomposition results for the squared poverty gap 
Source: Own calculation based on the HBS data for 2010. 
Notes: Decomposition is based on the Shapley value approach, using formulas (13) and (14), where the poverty 
measure P is the squared poverty gap (FGT2). Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. 
For full names of the counties, see Table 1. 
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Figure 10. Correlation between the income contributions and between the inequality 
contributions for FGT0 and FGT2 
 
A. Income contribution for FGT2 vs. income 
contribution for FGT0 
 
B. Inequality contribution for FGT2 vs. 
inequality contribution for FGT0 
Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. For full names of the counties, see 
Table 1. 
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